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NOTE
Deference, Clarity, and the Future of
Arbitration in Investor-State Dispute
Settlements
BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).
ROBERT N. MACE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, foreign investment has been a primary contributor to the increasing globalization of world economies. 1 The incursion of
foreign funds has allowed developing economies to create infrastructure, expand
employment opportunities, and move toward modernization. 2 International opportunities have allowed investors to expand their portfolios and establish a solid
footing in the future of the global marketplace. 3 Despite the advantages, investing
across international borders is not without risk: cultural and legal differences,
lack of citizen privileges, and differing priorities between investors and sovereign
states become barriers for parties wishing to do business with one another. Many
nations have established a legal framework in the form of bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) to overcome the disadvantages.4
In BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented
with a case of first impression dealing with a dispute resolution provision contained in a BIT. BG Group, a British investor in Argentinian natural gas distribution, argued that an arbitration panel should be given deference in its decision to
waive a pre-arbitration requirement contained in a BIT.5 Lacking precedential
authority concerning arbitration agreements contained in treaties, lower courts
disagreed whether the pre-arbitration issue was primarily for judicial or arbitral
determination.6 Ultimately, the Court chose to apply the interpretive framework

* B.S., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2016; Journal of Dispute Resolution, Lead Articles Editor, 2015-16; Associate Member, 201415. Special thanks to Professor S.I. Strong for her guidance and direction, the editors of the Journal of
Dispute Resolution—especially James R. Montgomery and Kevin Sack—for their time and feedback,
and my wife Emily Mace for her unwavering support.
1. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 68 (2005).
2. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2005).
3. Id. at 1524-25.
4. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains:
Investment And Trade For Development, at 101, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2013 (2013) [hereinafter
World Investment Report 2013].
5. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1205 (2014).
6. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 14

222

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2015

utilized in the review of domestic commercial arbitration agreements, and established that arbitration agreements in investment treaties are to be evaluated and
enforced under traditional contract theories. 7

II. FACTS & HOLDING
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Republic of Argentina initiated a
series of economic reforms aimed at stimulating the economy by reducing inflation and public debt and increasing foreign investment. 8 To encourage foreign
investment, Argentina entered into BITs with numerous countries. 9 One BIT,
which forms the controversy at issue in BG Group, PLC was The Agreement for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Treaty) 10 with the United Kingdom.11 Under the treaty, Argentina agreed to take steps to encourage U.K. investors to invest within its borders, and the United Kingdom agreed to do the same
with respect to Argentine investors. The Treaty was signed by Argentina and the
United Kingdom in 1990 and became effective in 1993.12 Importantly, the Treaty
assured foreign investors they would be given “fair and equitable treatment” and
prevented the host country from “expropriating the assets of . . . [foreign investors] without just compensation.”13 The two nations agreed to include a disputeresolution provision14 that would authorize arbitration of disputes between investors and the country of investment under two circumstances: (1) after the dispute
had been submitted to a local court or (2) upon agreement of both parties. 15
Around the same time, BG Group, a United Kingdom company, acquired a
majority interest in MetroGAS, an Argentine gas distributor. 16 MetroGAS was a
product of an Argentine economic reform that privatized the state-owned gas utility and divided it into new private companies open to foreign investment. 17 Argentina granted MetroGAS a thirty-five-year exclusive license to distribute natural
7. Id. at 1217-18.
8. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010) rev’d, 665 F.3d 1363
(D.C. Cir. 2012) rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1188 (2014) and vacated, 555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
and aff’d, 555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
9. Id.
10. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K., Dec. 11, 1990, 1765
U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments].
11. Republic of Arg., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
12. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 2795 (U.S. 2013) and rev’d, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) and vacated, 555 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
13. Republic of Arg., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (quoting Cross-Motion for Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Award at 1).
14. Article 8(2) of the Treaty provides for arbitration under two circumstances:
(a) if one of the Parties so requests . . . :
(i) where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment when the dispute
was submitted to [a] competent tribunal of the Contracting party in whose territory the
investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final decision;
(ii) where the final decision of the aforementioned tribunal has been made but the Parties are
still in dispute;
(b) where the Contracting Party and the investor of the other Contracting Party have so agreed.
Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, art. 8(2), supra note 10, at 38.
15. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014).
16. Republic of Arg., 715 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
17. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204.
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gas in Buenos Aires and portions of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.18 The
license stated that tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars and would be eligible
for review to ensure a reasonable return to investors. 19
An economic collapse in 2001 and 2002 prompted Argentina to enact emergency laws and regulations that directly affected MetroGAS. 20 These replaced the
U.S. dollar standard for tariff calculations with the lesser-valued peso21 and stayed
any lawsuits regarding the new laws for 180 days.22 To mitigate the negative
impact of the measures, Argentina established a renegotiation process for public
service contracts, but excluded companies that elected to dispute the laws in court
or arbitration.23 MetroGAS began sustaining losses, prompting BG Group to file a
Notice of Arbitration24 against Argentina pursuant to the Treaty.25 The parties
agreed to hold arbitration hearings in Washington, D.C. under the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law rules with the International Chamber of
Commerce as the appointing authority.26
In arbitration, BG Group argued Argentina’s enactment of laws affecting
MetroGAS violated the Treaty by expropriating its investment without just compensation and by denying it fair and equitable treatment. 27 Argentina denied it
had violated the Treaty and asserted the arbitration was without jurisdiction under
the Treaty.28 Argentina reasoned because BG Group was not an “investor,” its
interest in MetroGAS was not an “investment” and BG Group did not first submit
the dispute to an Argentine court as required by the Treaty. 29
In December 2007, the arbitration panel unanimously found Argentina had
not expropriated BG Group’s investment but had denied BG Group “fair and equitable treatment.”30 The panel rejected Argentina’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate, concluding BG Group was an “investor” and MetroGAS was
an “investment” under the Treaty, and that by limiting court access to companies,
Argentina excused BG Group’s failure to first submit the dispute to a local court.31
The panel awarded BG Group $185 million in damages. 32
18. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
19. Id.
20. BG Group, PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204.
21. Id. (the exchange rate was roughly 3 pesos for 1 U.S. dollar, reducing profits immediately by
one-third and increasing volatility because of the peso’s inconsistent exchange rate).
22. Republic of Arg., 665 F.3d at 1367.
23. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1205.
24. The proceedings were initiated on April 25, 2003. Republic of Arg. v. BG Group, PLC, 715 F.
Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010).
25. Over 25 foreign investors initiated arbitration against Argentina regarding the new laws. See
Mem. of Points and Authorities of BG Grp., PLC in Opp’n to Mot. to Vacate and in Supp. of Cross
Mot. for Recognition and Enforcement and for a Pre-Judgment Bond at 2; Republic of Arg. v. BG
Group, PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 113 (D.D.C. 2010).
26. Republic of Arg., 665 F.3d at 1367.
27. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2010).
31. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. at 99a, 145a, 161a, 171a
(No. 12-138), 2012 WL 3091067). The panel determined the 180-day stay of court decisions arising
from the new measures and the exclusion of some firms from the renegotiation process “hindered” BG
Group from recourse “to the domestic judiciary.” As a result, the Treaty implicitly excused compliance with the local litigation requirement. Id. at 1205, 1212 (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. at 165 (No.
12-138), 2012 WL 3091067).
32. Id. at 1205.
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In 2008, both parties filed for review in the District Court for the District of
Columbia.33 BG Group sought to affirm the award under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).34 Argentina sought to vacate the award under the FAA, arguing the
arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction because BG Group failed to adhere to the
local litigation requirements of the Treaty. 35 The District Court affirmed the
award, holding courts must give great deference to the determinations of the arbitration panel and the panel had not exceeded its authority in its interpretation of
the local litigation requirement.36 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed; determining the interpretation and application of the local
litigation requirement was an independent question of law for the courts to decide
de novo.37 The Court of Appeals held the arbitration panel erred by determining
BG Group was excused from compliance with the local litigation requirement and
vacated the award.38
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that when a
court reviews an arbitration made under a treaty, it should apply the interpretive
framework developed for traditional contracts in American law.39 Under this
framework,40 the Court found the local litigation requirement was a procedural
precondition to arbitration and, as such, was presumptively for an arbitrator to
decide.41 The Court found nothing in the Treaty that overcame that presumption,
thus the judgment of the arbitrators should have been given deference by the reviewing courts.42 Upon deferential review, the Court determined the conclusions
of the arbitration panel were lawful and within its interpretive authority. 43 The
Court ultimately held that without explicit limitations on consent, a local litigation
requirement is primarily for arbitrators to interpret and apply. 44

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Because a party can only be required to submit a dispute to arbitration if it has
previously agreed to do so, consent is a pivotal question in arbitration cases. 45
Inherent in the question of consent is the antecedent question of whether the judge
or the arbitrator should determine whether there was initial consent. 46 The distinction is significant: arbitral awards are subject to judicial review with great deference given to arbitral decisions, but questions reserved for the courts are reviewed
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 204, 207 (2015) (providing a party can confirm an award in Federal
court).
35. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1205; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2015) (allows the vacating of an
award in Federal court when arbitrators “exceeded their powers”).
36. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 121-22 (D.D.C. 2010).
37. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
38. Id. at 1373.
39. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1201; see also infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
40. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1201 (courts usually look first to the plain text in order to determine
whether a dispute arises out of the arbitration, or whether it is a dispute about the agreement to arbitrate).
41. Id. at 1204.
42. Id. at 1208.
43. Id. at 1212.
44. Id. at 1204.
45. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
46. Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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de novo.47 Ultimately, it is the prerogative of the contracting parties to determine
which issues are for arbitrators and which are to be left for courts. 48 When an
agreement is silent on the matter of who primarily is to decide preliminary questions about arbitration, courts determine the parties’ intent with the help of presumptions.49

A. The Issue of Arbitrability
To avoid rendering arbitration a mere prelude to the cumbersome and timeconsuming judicial review process, the U.S. Supreme Court has long endorsed a
liberal policy favoring arbitration with limited judicial review. 50 But as a product
of contract, arbitration requires party consent to establish jurisdiction. 51 The Supreme Court has made clear the policy favoring arbitration does not presumptively
apply to questions of “arbitrability” — whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a
dispute.52 Thus, a court must distinguish between questions arising within the
arbitration agreement — which are presumptively for arbitrators — and questions
concerning the arbitrability of a dispute, which are presumptively for judges. 53
Whether or not the issue is about arbitrability is not always clear.54 In
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified that not every
potentially dispositive gateway question concerns arbitrability. 55 Questions of
arbitrability have a limited scope containing only the kind of gateway questions
that parties might expect a court to decide: “procedural” questions arising from
the dispute do not concern arbitrability and should be left to the arbitrator. 56
The Court first differentiated procedural questions in John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Livingston,57 a case in which a union and a publishing company could not agree
on the status of a collective bargaining agreement concerning the rights of covered
employees after a company merger.58 The company refused to recognize the bargaining agreement and the union filed suit to compel arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement pursuant to federal law. 59 The publishing company
argued the collective bargaining agreement had not survived the merger, and even
if it had, the union had not complied with the necessary procedural steps to reach
arbitration.60 Thus, two questions emerged: (1) whether the court or an arbitrator

47. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-48 (1995).
48. Id. at 943.
49. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1206.
50. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
51. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 592 (1960).
52. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 83-84.
55. Id. at 84.
56. Id. at 83-84, (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)). Additionally, issues concerning “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,” should be
left to arbitrators. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
57. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
58. Id. at 544-46.
59. Id. at 545-46. The union sought to compel arbitration pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See id. at 544; 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2015).
60. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 546.
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should decide whether the arbitration provisions survived the merger; 61 and (2)
whether a court or an arbitrator should determine if the procedural conditions to
arbitration had been met.62
In John Wiley, precedent dictated the duty to arbitrate was contractual; therefore, the determination of whether the duty does in fact exist is a question of
arbitrability for judicial determination.63 Looking next at the procedural conditions, the Court found although the conditions presented gateway questions to
arbitration, the questions could not be answered without considering the merits of
the dispute.64 To avoid unnecessary and illogical forum-splitting, once it is determined parties are obligated to submit a dispute to arbitration, “‘procedural’
questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition should be
left to the arbitrator.”65 Regarding procedural disagreements as part of the dispute
and not as separate disputes served the “best accords with the usual purposes” of
arbitration and federal policy.66
Because it is not always intuitive, the Court has attempted to provide guidance on the distinction between questions that should be judicially determined and
those that should be determined by arbitrators. In First Options of Chicago v.
Kaplan, the Court determined that it is courts that decide whether arbitration
clauses should be enforced upon a party who had not personally signed the document.67 Similarly, in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, the
Court found courts are to decide whether a particular labor-management layoff
dispute falls within the arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining contract.68
Additionally, in Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., the Court held that courts decide whether clauses providing for arbitration of various “grievances” covers
claims for damages for breach of a no-strike agreement.69
Conversely, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Corp.,
the Court held “allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”
are presumptively for the arbitrator to decide,70 as are questions regarding satisfaction of prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppel, and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate. 71 Additionally, the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act of 2000 states “procedural” questions include conditions precedent to arbitration such as time limits, notice, laches, and estoppel.72
In sum, the case law surrounding who decides — courts or arbitrators —
demonstrates a consistent aim to effectuate the use of arbitration in accordance
with the consent of parties who enter the agreements. 73 The rationale behind the
designation of questions of arbitrability to judges and procedural questions to
arbitrators maintains the presumption that parties intend to align decision makers
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 557.
Id.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 376 U.S. at 559.
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-47 (1995).
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986).
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241-43 (1962).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (quoting REVISED UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) cmt. 2, 7 U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2002)).
72. REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) cmt. 2, 7 U.L.A. 12-13 (Supp. 2002).
73. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
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with their fields of relevant expertise, so as to best secure fair and expeditious
resolutions of arbitration disagreements. 74

B. Bilateral Investment Treaties
BITs are negotiated agreements between two nations that protect investments
by citizens of one nation who are in the territory of the other by creating rules
governing the host nation’s treatment of the investment and establishing dispute
resolution mechanisms for alleged violations of those rules. 75 Unlike commercial
treaties,76 the primary purpose of BITs is not to facilitate trade, but rather to attract
foreign investment by ensuring fair and equitable treatment.77 BITs have emerged
as an important tool for the protection and promotion of the increasingly important
international economic activity of foreign investment and have increased substantially in number since the 1950s.78
Though BITs carry the same force of any international treaty, they typically
allow greater flexibility for termination, revision, or replacement. Most BITs can
be terminated unilaterally or by mutual consent. The Vienna Convention allows
parties to terminate their agreement by mutual consent at any time; 79 however, the
rules for unilateral treaty termination are typically described in the BIT itself. 80
Most BITs have an initial term of 10 or 15 years, after which about 80% of all
BITs then allow the agreement to be terminated any point. 81 Additionally, BITs
can be revised through amendments that modify or remove existing provisions in
a treaty or add new ones. 82

C. Review of Arbitral Decisions
The review of arbitration awards under BITs typically must be sought pursuant to the law of the nation in which the arbitration takes place. 83 The New York
Convention is an international convention created in 1958 that governs international arbitration.84 For parties to the convention, it is an important tool in the
74. Id.
75. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J.
469, 469-70 (2000).
76. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation treaties, have been around since the founding of the
American Republic, and typically, these agreements provide for most-favored-nation treatment with
respect to trade, mutual guarantees against discrimination, exchange of consuls, and duties of parties
with respect to neutral trade in time of war. Vandevelde, supra note 75, at 203-04.
77. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 83.
78. Id. at 67 (citing U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2003 FDI Policies
For Development: National And International Perspectives, 89, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003
(Sept. 4, 2003) (from 1959 to 2002 nearly 2200 BITs were created)).
79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
80. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 108. If not, the rules of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties apply. Id. at 118 n.55.
81. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 109.
82. Id. at 108.
83. KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND
INTERPRETATION 446 (2010).
84. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention] (arbitrations initiated under ICSID
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recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards. The New York Convention applies to the “recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of
such awards are sought.”85
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act 86 is an act of Congress that
governs the resolution of disputes through foreign and domestic arbitration and
incorporates the New York Convention. 87 The FAA and the New York Convention provide a party to arbitration may move to affirm or vacate an award in the
federal court of the place of arbitration.88 When reviewing an award made in the
United States under the FAA, the federal court generally applies U.S. law. 89
Under the FAA, there are limited grounds upon which a court may vacate or
overturn the decisions of an arbitration panel seated in the United States. 90 Section 9 of the FAA states a court must grant confirmation of an award unless “vacated, modified, or corrected” pursuant to sections 10 or 11.91 Section 10 provides
grounds upon which a court may vacate an award, such as fraud or an arbitration
panel that has exceeded its power.92 Section 11 provides grounds for correction,
such as a material mistake.93 The Supreme Court has reiterated these grounds are
intended to be narrow.94
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is
an important body in commercial arbitration.95 UNCITRAL developed The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) in 1985 in an effort
to make the treatment of commercial arbitration consistent from one country to the
next.96 Article 8 of the Model Law provides for the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements through national courts, regardless of the location of the arbitration.97 Article 16 grants arbitrators authority to consider their own jurisdiction,
and Article 5 prescribes judicial non-intervention in proceedings.98 The Model
Law also affirms party autonomy with regard to arbitral procedures, absent an
agreement between the parties.99
An important governing regime or arbitration specific to investment treaties is
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 100 The

are generally not subject to the New York Convention or national arbitration legislation); see also
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 40 (2012).
85. New York Convention, supra note 84, at art. I(1) (1958).
86. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2014).
87. Id. at §§ 201-208.
88. Id. at §§ 9, 10.
89. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 7, 1959, Art.
V(1)(e), 1970 WL 104417.
90. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11.
91. Id. at § 9.
92. Id. § 10.
93. Id. § 11.
94. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008).
95. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 115 (2009) [hereinafter BORN, INT’L
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION].
96. GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW & PRACTICE 23 (2012) [hereinafter BORN,
LAW & PRACTICE].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 40.
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ICSID Convention is a specialized international treaty 101 that facilitates settlement
investment disputes between consenting parties. 102 If parties agree to submit a
dispute to ICSID arbitration, the ICSID Convention provides a stand-alone legal
framework generally not subject to the New York Convention or other arbitration
governing legislation.103 If parties agree to submit a dispute to ICSID arbitration,
it will be administered wholly by ICSID and almost entirely detached from national law and national courts.104

D. Interpreting Treaties
Like arbitration under traditional contracts, arbitration between a State and a
foreign investor under an investment treaty is based on consent. 105 Arbitration
under a treaty is unique because consent does not come directly from the parties in
arbitration (state and foreign investors), but instead comes from the multiple states
that were signatories to the original treaty. 106 Consequently, review of arbitration
awards under investment treaties includes interpretation of treaties.
In Air France v. Saks, the U.S. Supreme Court determined treaties should be
interpreted more liberally than private agreements given their nature and purpose.107 This purpose includes determining a treaty’s meaning by looking beyond
the written words: to the history of the treaty, the negotiations involved, and the
practical interpretation adopted by the parties. 108 Despite this liberal interpretive
approach, a reviewing court should also begin its analysis by reviewing the plain
text and context of the treaty.109 A court must ultimately give the words of the
treaty “a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.”110 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides similar guidance, directing courts to begin with the plain language of a treaty when interpreting its meaning.111 Although courts may find such guidance helpful, the extent to

101. There were 151 contracting parties as of April 18, 2015. Id. at 412 (citing List of Contracting
States and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID (April 18, 2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Si
gnatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf).
102. BORN, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 96, at 412.
103. Id. at 40.
104. Id. at 412 (citing International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, Oct.
14, 1966, Arts. 41, 52, 53, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/
CRR_English-final.pdf; C. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 516–24 (2d
ed. 2009)).
105. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur and Remand, BG Grp., PLC
v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 4737184, *15 (citing
CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 219 (2008); Christoph Schreuer,
Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 830, 831
(Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); VANDEVELDE, supra note 83, at 433; JESWALD W. SALACUSE,
THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 385 (2010)).
106. Id.
107. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 397.
110. Id. at 399 (citing Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977)).
111. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 79, at
art. 26) (the United States is a signatory to the treaty but has not ratified the treaty; nevertheless, the
treaty’s instruction is useful in determining international norms).
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which treaties should be evaluated differently from traditional contracts is not
always clear.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, and found that arbitrators’ jurisdictional determinations are lawful.112 In doing so, it established the guidelines for interpreting
provisions in ordinary contracts should also be used to interpret and apply a treaty’s gateway provisions concerning arbitration. 113 Under this framework, the local
litigation requirement was a matter for arbitrators to interpret, entitled to judicial
deference.114

A. Procedural Precondition to Arbitration — The Majority Opinion
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the Treaty as if it were an ordinary
contract.115 Citing Howsam, it determined the requirement of local litigation was
a procedural question of arbitrability, as the provision determined when the duty
to arbitrate began, not whether such a duty existed.116 Furthermore, no explicit
language deposed the presumption that the provision, as a procedural precondition, should be interpreted and applied by arbitrators.117
Under ordinary contract law, jurisdiction belonged to the arbitrators; however, the appropriateness of making such an application to a treaty remained in question.118 A treaty, according to the Court, is essentially a contract between nations,
and like an ordinary contract, the foundation of its interpretation should be the
intent of the parties.119 Under the FAA, a court should apply the framework supplied by U.S. law; because the local litigation requirement was not clearly stated
as a condition of consent to arbitration, the traditional contract framework was
appropriate.120 The Court reserved the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the traditional
contract framework would be appropriate when interpreting a provision clearly
stated as a condition of consent.121 As a result, the fact the document was a treaty
did not make a critical difference to the high Court’s analysis.122
The Court next searched for other evidence in the Treaty that would alter the
presumption the parties intended threshold arbitration issues to be left to the arbi-

112. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 (2014).
113. Id. at 1210.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1206.
116. Id. at 1207.
117. Id.
118. BG Grp., PLC 134 S. Ct. at 1208.
119. Id. (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)).
120. Id. at 1208-09; see also New York Convention, supra note 84, at art. V(1)(e) (an award can be
“set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made”); VANDEVELDE, supra note 83, at 446 (arbitration awards under treaties are
“subject to review under the arbitration law of the state where the arbitration takes place”);
CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR–STATE ARBITRATION 636 (2008) (“[T]he national courts and
the law of the legal status of arbitration control a losing party’s attempt to set aside [an] award.”).
121. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1209.
122. Id. at 1208.
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trators.123 No evidence indicated either of the parties had an intent contrary to the
ordinary presumptions, and the text and structure of the litigation requirement
made clear it was a procedural condition precedent to arbitration. 124 The Treaty
did, however, authorize the use of international arbitration associations125 whose
rules granted arbitrators the authority to determine provisions like the local litigation provision.126 Furthermore, the majority of international authorities agreed the
local litigation provision was a procedural precondition to arbitration. 127 Finding
the ordinary presumption was not overcome, the Court held interpretation and
application of the provision should primarily be left to the arbitrator and lower
courts should have reviewed the arbitrator’s decision with considerable deference.128
Having determined the arbitrator’s decision should be given deference; the
Court lastly reviewed the decision of the arbitrators to excuse BG Group’s noncompliance with the local litigation requirement. 129 Argentina argued the arbitration panel exceeded its authority even if the standard was one of high deference. 130
The Court rejected Argentina’s argument and found the arbitrators’ conclusion the
litigation provision was not an absolute impediment to arbitration was within the
arbitral forum’s interpretative discretion.131 Ultimately, this holding affirmed the
arbitrators’ initial conclusion that Argentina’s actions precluded BG Group’s obligation to adhere to the local litigation provision was not barred by the Treaty. 132

B. Parties May Condition Consent — The Concurring Opinion
Justice Sotomayor agreed with the majority that the provision was a procedural precondition to arbitration, but wrote separately to address the majority’s
dicta regarding the interpretation of treaties containing explicit conditions of con-

123. Id. at 1210.
124. Id. “[The Treaty] says that a dispute ‘shall be submitted to international arbitration’ if ‘one of
the Parties so requests,’ as long as ‘a period of eighteen months has elapsed’ since the dispute was
‘submitted’ to a local tribunal and the tribunal ‘has not given its final decision.’ . . . It determines when
the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all.” Id. at
1207 (quoting Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, supra note 10, at art. 8(2)).
125. Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, supra note 10, at art. 8(3) (providing the agreement
would be enforced pursuant to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) as well as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)).
126. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1210 (2014); accord, U.N. Commission on
Int’l Trade law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 23(1), G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22
(Jan. 10, 2011) (“[the] arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction”); Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 41(1),
Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (providing that the “[t]ribunal shall be the judge of its own competence”).
127. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1211 (“A substantial body of arbitral authority from investor-state
disputes concludes that compliance with procedural mechanisms in an arbitration agreement (or bilateral investment treaty) is not ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite” (quoting BORN, INT’L
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 95, at 842)).
128. Id. at 1210.
129. Id. at 1212; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2014) (providing that an award may be vacated “where
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”).
130. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1212.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1213.
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sent.133 Sotomayor argued that if a clear condition of consent 134 was placed on a
seemingly procedural treaty provision it would likely raise questions of
arbitrability that would need to be decided by a court. 135 In her view, consent is
“especially salient in the context of bilateral investment treaties” because they
involve agreements between a nation and an unknown class of investors, rather
than two known parties.136 Explicit language may demonstrate a nation reasonably wished to create conditions that had to be satisfied before submitting its sovereign decisions to a foreign arbitration panel. 137 If the provision at issue were
clearly labeled a condition to the consent of the parties, it would change the analysis to a determination of whether the parties intended the requirement to be interpreted by a court or an arbitrator.138

C. Condition of Consent to Arbitration — The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, disagreed that the litigation
provision was merely a procedural precondition to arbitration.139 In dissent, they
argued the investment treaty could not constitute an agreement to arbitrate because no investor was a party to the Treaty. 140 Instead, the treaty was merely an
offer by the signatory nations to arbitrate, and no agreement was created until the
investor submitted the dispute in accordance with the local litigation requirement.141
The dissent began its analysis by considering the plain language and purpose
of the treaty.142 Of particular importance was the fact the “arbitration clause” in
the treaty was not a stand-alone provision, but was rather a subordinate part of a
broader dispute resolution provision. 143 The arbitration provision provided three
routes to arbitration: two through local litigation, and one through mutual agreement.144 The alternative routes to arbitration demonstrated Argentina did not intend the provision to be an existing agreement, but rather an agreement to be
formed once a foreign investor satisfied the conditions. 145 Another arbitration
tribunal146 had also reached this conclusion about the local litigation require133. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 1214. “Consider, for example, the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement . . . includes a provision explicitly entitled ‘Conditions and Limitations on Consent of Each Party.’ That
provision declares that ‘[n]o claim may be submitted to arbitration’ unless a claimant first waives its
‘right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court . . . any proceeding with respect
to any measure alleged to constitute a breach’ under another provision of the treaty.” Id. (quoting Free
Trade Agreement Between The United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., art.
11.18, June 30, 2007, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/
asset_upload_file587_12710.pdf)).
135. Id. at 1213 (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)).
136. BG Grp., PLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1213.
137. Id. at 1214.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1216.
141. Id.
142. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1215.
143. Id. at 1216-17.
144. Id. at 1217.
145. Id.
146. See ICS Inspection & Control Servs. Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. 2010–9, Award on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 262 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2012), http://www.italaw.com/documents/
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ment.147 The dissent rebuffed the majority’s finding of a lack of explicit language
dispositive in determining the litigation requirement could not be a condition to
consent. Other terms in the Treaty also clearly constituted conditions148 even
though not explicitly labeled. 149
Argentina’s status as a sovereign state was further persuasion the local litigation requirement was a condition on consent and not a simple procedural precondition.150 It was no light matter for a state to waive sovereign immunity and allow
sovereign decisions to be reviewed by foreign adjudicators. 151 This is especially
true when the reviewing body is neither domestic nor judicial. 152 The dissent
concluded that, within this context, the United Kingdom and Argentina intended
to require special limitations on the use of arbitration by foreign investors. 153
Local litigation requirement is an important limitation because it gives the host
country the opportunity to render a decision on the dispute first, to narrow the
range of issues before arbitration, or to induce a settlement and eliminate the need
for arbitration altogether.154
Since the Treaty’s local litigation requirement was a condition of consent to
arbitrate, review was to be de novo.155 The Court found that logically an arbitrator
could not decide if the parties have consented if the arbitrators’ authority itself
depends on the decision.156 Under Howsam, since the consent of the parties was
in controversy, it is for the courts to decide whether consent existed, or else arbitrators risk forcing parties to arbitrate a dispute. 157
Ultimately, the dissent found the Court of Appeals was correct to determine
the case should be reviewed de novo; but also disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s
conclusion that BG Group did not submit its dispute to the local courts first, and
thereby invalidated the award by the arbitration panel. 158 A “leading treatise”
states an offeree’s failure to comply with a condition will not negate an action if
failure to comply is the offeror’s fault. 159 The dissent determined the case should
be remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine de novo whether this principle
was incorporated into the Treaty. 160 As a result, the opinions of both the majority
ICS_v_Argentina_AwardJurisdiction_10Feb2012_En.pdf. (“Not only has the Respondent specifically
conditioned its consent to arbitration on a requirement not yet fulfilled, but the Contracting Parties to
the Treaty have expressly required the prior submission of a dispute to the Argentine courts for at least
18 months, before a recourse to international arbitration is initiated. The Tribunal is simply not empowered to disregard these limits on its jurisdiction.”).
147. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1218.
148. Must be a foreign investor, must have a treaty claim, and must be suing another party to the
treaty. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1219.
151. Id.
152. JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 137 (2010) (“Granting a private party
the right to bring an action against a sovereign state in an international tribunal regarding an investment dispute is a revolutionary innovation” whose “uniqueness and power should not be overlooked.”).
153. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1219.
154. Id. at 1221.
155. Id. (citing Adams v. Suozzi, 433 F.3d 220, 226–28 (2d Cir. 2005)).
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002)).
158. Id. at 1223.
159. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1224 (citing RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 5:14
(4th ed. 2013)).
160. Id.
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and dissent may have resulted in the same outcome for the parties; nevertheless,
the impact of each decision on the law could hardly be more divergent.

V. COMMENT
The dispute between BG Group and Argentina presents a unique and confounding question of first impression before the U.S. Supreme Court. The controversy contained many elements similar to commercial arbitration disputes, but
also presented unique considerations like treaty interpretation and sovereignty.
Unsurprisingly, the striking characteristics of the instant decision are the Court’s
unambiguous attempt to bring clarity to the very muddled topic and its desire to
strongly affirm policies favoring arbitration autonomy. Although the decision in
BG Group, PLC should only apply domestically, it may ultimately have an effect
on arbitration globally, given the popularity of the United States as the seat of
arbitration as well as the level of influence wielded by the American Supreme
Court.161

A. Framing the Analysis
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit relied on
much the same case law, yet announced different holdings. A significant factor in
the courts’ incongruous outcomes was the starting analyses point. The Supreme
Court began by reviewing the dispute as if it were a contract between private parties.162 It distinguished substantive and procedural questions of arbitrability and
respective presumptions as it previously had in Howsam.163 Applying these presumptions, the Court analyzed the parties’ intent using the proper presumption. 164
On the other hand, the Appellate Court left the lower court’s discretion undisturbed unless clear evidence of intent to the contrary existed.165 The Appellate
Court devoted the majority of its analysis to the determination whether the parties
intended the question of arbitrability to be answered by an arbitrator.166 The Appellate Court focused on how John Wiley and Howsam differed from the present
dispute.

B. Aligning International and Domestic Arbitration Decisions
BG Group, PLC signals the Court’s aligning of BIT interpretative framework
with commercial arbitration provisions. The Supreme Court rejected the narrow
application and muddled distinction of John Wiley and Howsam, choosing instead
to recognize the similarities between commercial and investment arbitration prior
to analyzing differences.167 Because it declined to adopt the dissent’s view that a
new framework should be developed to allow for greater judicial review of awards
granted under BITs, the Court in BG Group, PLC makes an important statement
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See BORN, INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 95, at 2063.
BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1206.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Republic of Arg. v. BG Grp., PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1369-70 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
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regarding the importance of autonomy in international arbitration tribunals. This
conclusion affirmed the longstanding recognition and enforcement of a liberal
policy favoring arbitration and endorses a broad application of Howsam in determining the scope of judicial review of arbitration decisions.168

C. Possible Negative Impacts on Sovereigns
As the dissent notes, there are legitimate reasons a State might desire an investor to first file a dispute in a local court, while still giving investors the absolute assurance that they have recourse in arbitration. 169 States have increasingly
sought to resolve BIT disputes domestically. 170 A recent study on Investor-State
Dispute settlements (ISDS) found “70% of recent treaties explicitly mention domestic judicial review as a dispute settlement mechanism in their ISDS clauses.
Many also seek to coordinate the use of domestic judicial review with investor
recourse in international arbitration.”171 The trend favoring international arbitration as recourse to domestic judicial procedures may demonstrate that local review
provisions are important parts of states’ consent to arbitrate. 172 Although the
Court’s deferential approach may prove beneficial for investors and courts
through increased clarity and judicial efficiency, it carried the potential to also
aggravate some systemic deficiencies in the regime of investor-state dispute settlements.173
The 2013 World Investment Report, published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, identifies several “systemic deficiencies” existing in the dispute settlement regime between investors and the states that may be
impacted by the Court’s holding in BG Group, PLC.174 First, it is questionable
whether arbitration panels can be entrusted with evaluating the validity of a
States’ acts, especially when such questions involve issues of policy. 175 Sovereignty allows a nation to maintain its own economic affairs, handle financial crises, and control its own development. 176 In the wake of the recent world financial
crisis, economic self-determination has become an especially cogent part of the
argument in favor of national sovereignty. 177 Both the dissent and concurrence
bring to light the weightiness of a sovereign’s decision to grant private adjudica-

168. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002).
169. Id.
170. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for
the Investment Policy Community 65 (Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Working Papers on Int’l
Inv. No. 2012/03, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2012
_3.pdf.
171. Id. See, e.g., Arg.-U.K. Agreement for Investments, supra note 10, at art. 8(2) (providing claimants the ability to file in domestic court before moving to arbitration).
172. Id.; see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1214 (2014).
173. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 112.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Duncan E. Williams, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging Market
Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the International Legal Regime, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 601 (2001).
177. Robert M. Ziff, The Sovereign Debtor’s Prison: Analysis of the Argentine Crisis Arbitrations
and the Implications for Investment Treaty Law, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 345, 348 (2011).
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tors “a power it typically reserves to its own courts, if it grants it at all: the power
to sit in judgment on its sovereign acts.” 178
The claims against Argentina raise important questions about the balance that
needs to be struck between (1) BITs’ guarantee of a stable climate for foreign
investors and, (2) a sovereign’s ability to respond to economic crises with independence and in good faith.179 As the dissent noted, the weighty public responsibilities of a sovereign will affect the expectations regarding obligations under a
BIT; likewise, the tumultuous nature of world economic conditions should cause
investors’ expectations to incorporate the possibility that extraordinary circumstances may necessitate state regulatory action.180 In the instant decision, the
Court elected not to distinguish this unique attribute of sovereign parties and instead extended the same presumptions utilized in commercial arbitration disputes.181 This will likely put some sovereign nations in an uneasy position, as
they must more carefully weigh the economic incentives of BITs against possible
restrictions on economic planning and policy implementation.
Second, sovereign nations’ ability to weigh the important consequences of
BITs is undercut by inconsistent findings by arbitral tribunals. 182 Divergent legal
interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions as well as differences in the
assessment of the merits of cases create uncertainty that may well be compounded
by the instant decision.183 Indeed, arbitral tribunals have already rendered inconsistent decisions regarding the effect of the local litigation requirement and similar
provisions as the dissent pointed out.184 No decision by the Supreme Court would
provide complete consistency given the many operative legal frameworks around
the globe; however, a decision providing for greater judicial oversight would at
least produce greater consistency to parties choosing to arbitrate in the United
States.
Though inconsistency is to some degree the nature of arbitration, the concern
is especially heightened when the inconsistency concerns the consent of the parties to arbitrate. By determining local litigation provisions are presumptively for
arbitrators, States may now be subjected to differing interpretations of consent to
arbitrate. As a result, local litigation requirements will be thrown into uncertainty
as they are at times deemed necessary for consent, and other times determined
waivable. Such a result is not simply undesirable, but also in conflict with traditional views that treaties should be interpreted liberally to meet the challenges of
State agreements.185

178. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1220 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
179. Ziff, supra note 177, at 354-55.
180. Id. at 361.
181. BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1208.
182. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 112.
183. Id.
184. BG Grp., PLC 134 S. Ct. at 1218; see also ICS Inspection & Control Servs. Ltd. v. Argentine
Republic, PCA Case No. 2010–9, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 262 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/documents/ICS_v_Argentina_AwardJurisdiction_10Feb2012_En.pdf
(the
panel concluded it had no jurisdiction until the local litigation provision was fulfilled); Daimler Fin.
Servs. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶¶ 193, 194 (ICSID Trib. 2012),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf; Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 116 (ICSID Trib. 2008), http://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0907.pdf.
185. See Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985); Vienna Convention, supra note 79.
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Third, an increasing number of challenges to arbitrators may indicate that
disputing parties perceive them as biased or predisposed.186 Particular concerns
have arisen from perceived tendencies of each disputing party to appoint individuals sympathetic to their own case; concerns amplified by arbitrators’ interest in
being re-appointed in future cases and a tendency to serve as arbitrators in some
cases and counsel in others.187 It appears over 50% of ISDS arbitrators have acted
as counsel for investors in other ISDS cases, while it has been estimated about
10% of ISDS arbitrators acted as counsel for States in other cases. 188 Such statistics may also imply a predisposition favoring investors: at the end of 2012, 31%
of ISDS cases ended in favor of the investor and 27% were settled. 189 Additionally, ICSID tribunals upheld investor claims in approximately 46% of cases, with
only 28% of cases seeing investor claims dismissed. 190
Such concerns hold a potential impact for the perceived legitimacy of international arbitration: over the past decade, three States — Bolivia, Ecuador, and
Venezuela — have withdrawn from ICSID, claiming investment arbitration erodes
sovereignty while favoring investors. 191 These governments are not alone in their
criticisms of the current international arbitration framework. 192 Even proponents
of investment arbitration like the United States and Canada have revisited their
model BITs to limit the scope of investor protections. 193

D. Possible Future Effects
Despite the discontent of some sovereigns, 194 the instant decision is likely to
maintain the United States’ position as a leader in hosting international arbitration
tribunals.195 In a system where autonomy is fundamental, leaving responsibility in
the hands of the parties and arbitral governance regimes is perhaps imperative to
its survival. As UNCITRAL and other groups develop solutions to the “systemic
deficiencies” in ISDS, BG Group, PLC may well be seen internationally as an
important instance of judicial restraint.

186. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 112; see also Gaukroder & Gordon, supra note
170, at 65.
187. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 112.
188. Gaukroder & Gordon, supra note 170, at 65.
189. World Investment Report 2013, supra note 4, at 111.
190. The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, Issue 2014-2, ICSID 14 (June 30, 2014), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/01/12/000442464_20150112
143506/Rendered/PDF/936220NWP0Box30ats020140200English0.pdf.
191. BORN, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 96, at 412; see also ICSID, List of Contracting States and
Other Signatories of the Convention, (April 18, 2015), https://icsid.worldbank.org/
apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Si
gnatories%20of%20the%20Convention%20-%20Latest.pdf.
192. See An Open Letter from Lawyers to the Negotiators of the Trans-Pacific P’Ship Urging the
Rejection of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (May 8, 2012), available at http://www.tpplegal.
wordpress.com/open-letter.
193. See 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY, available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/188371.pdf. Canada also maintains a “Model Foreign Investment and Protection treaty” available at http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.
194. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
195. See BORN, INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 95.
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The instant decision will likely serve to impose a clear rule that will require
parties to state their intent “clearly and unmistakably.” 196 Unfortunately, the
court’s failure to conclusively clarify what language demonstrates a clear intent to
reserve consent will certainly add some uncertainty to the drafting process. Additionally, the instant decision may have some consequences for investors as States
have no choice but to restrict paths to international arbitration if they want to
maintain a consistently enforceable local litigation provision. 197 Although BG
Group, PLC refused to find enough distinction in the fact the creation of a BIT is
not manifested between contesting parties to warrant abandonment of the traditional contract framework, it does not change the fact investors are not present
when BITs are formed. As a result, investors may see further-restricted paths to
arbitration, but no voice in the BIT drafting process to oppose these restrictions. 198

VI. CONCLUSION
The result in BG Group, PLC demonstrates the Court’s desire to sustain arbitration as an effective and independent means of resolving disputes. The Court
displayed an inclination to limit the influence of the judiciary on the process of
BIT arbitration, recognizing the important position of BITs in global commerce
and the prominence of the United States. 199 Ultimately, the Court aligned the
interpretive framework of domestic and international arbitration review in an effort to simplify review for courts and better inform stakeholders to the level of
involvement of the judicial system in BITs that contain arbitration provisions. 200
Though the effect of this decision is still somewhat unclear, it will likely be
met with divergent reactions. Some States may see the decision as an affront to
national sovereignty and as an aggravation to some systemic deficiencies in the
ISDS regime.201 As a result, these States may regard the system as less legitimate
and attempt to restrict investor’s accessibility to arbitration through BIT revision.202 Such a result would be injurious to investors who have no voice in the
process and could ultimately decrease mutually beneficial investment. Conversely, many parties might also see the Court’s deferential approach as beneficial to
the arbitration process via increased clarity and judicial efficiency. 203 In this way,
the decision may be seen as an important instance of judicial restraint — upholding the foundational aspect of autonomy in arbitration — and leaving ISDS development in the hands of parties and arbitral governance regimes.

196. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1222-23 (2014) (citing Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
197. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
198. See BORN, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 96, at 416-17.
199. See supra notes 1-4, 161 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 186-9 and accompanying text.
203. See BORN, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 96, at 419.
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